ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Jordan is facing a future of very limited water resources. In 2010, these equated to a per capita share of water of shortage that will constrain economic growth and potentially endanger public health (Mousa ; El-Naser ).
Groundwater is the major domestic water supply source for most population centers of Jordan, but aquifers are already exploited above their safe yields (Humpal et al. ) . In response to this situation, Jordan has adopted a strategy of extending its current small-scale abstraction of fossil groundwater from the Ram aquifer, which has been projected to be able to provide 100-125 million m 3 /y of comprised of the Ram aquifer, which is distributed through- and showed a wide range of activities (Table 1) . Comparison with the Jordanian standard at that time (JS ) showed that over 85% of the samples exceeded the gross alpha and beta reference limits (0.5 Bq/l and 1.0 Bq/l, respectively).
Measured gross alpha and gross beta activities were consistent with activities of 226 Ra determined in waters from the Ram aquifer which ranged from 0.11 to 0.98 Bq/l. These data correspond to a yearly dose from 0.02 to 0.20 mSv/y based solely on the activity of 226 Ra (assuming the water had been consumed at the point of sampling). A parallel unpublished study also reported to WHO via CEHA investigated the contribution made by individual radionuclides to the total estimated radiological dose incurred by an adult • Conducting further studies and investigations regarding radiological water quality in the Ram aquifer.
• Conducting health assessment studies.
• Cost-benefit analysis of treatment options including but not limited to blending with other water sources and active treatment using reverse osmosis and lime softening.
• Performing investigations into the viable waste management of radioactive residue from active treatment.
• • WHO guidelines for drinking water quality are advisory and not mandatory. Countries are encouraged to develop their own standards based on careful review of the prevailing environmental, social and economic conditions.
• The choice of national approach to managing a specific risk in drinking water quality is entirely a national decision.
• Exceeding the screening level 0.1 mSv/y does not necessarily mean the water is unsafe for drinking, but further investigation is required into the radionuclide composition of the water.
• WAJ estimate the annual contribution of 228 Ra and 226 Ra to be about 0.6 mSv/y (in the well field); this should be compared to the normal background levels from all internal and external sources of radiation exposure, which typically range from 1 to 10 mSv/y. This therefore, does not represent a significant increase in overall health risk from radiation exposure. This conclusion would not justify immediate corrective action.
• Raising the effective screening dose in Jordan from 0.1 to 0.5 mSv/y is based on a conviction that the potential health risks brought about are tolerable and that the net health benefits outweigh the potential health risks. The MWI/WAJ approach to the issue is quite reasonable,
and not in contradiction with the guidance provided in the WHO guidelines for drinking water quality regarding the radioactivity guideline values.
• The remaining procedures described under the recommendations seem appropriate and logical.
More recent independent investigations (BRGM ; • Naturally occurring radionuclide concentrations in 55
water supply and nine aquifer monitoring wells associated with the DWCP prior to and during active operation.
• Proposed mitigation options from the perspective of actual measured outcomes.
• Compliance against Jordanian standards for drinking water quality both at the well-head and as close as practicable to the point of actual public consumption.
METHODOLOGY
The well field
In Jordan, the unconfined portion of the Ram aquifer covers a total area of over 3,000 km 2 under the southern desert ( Following drilling and casing, the wells were developed by airlift/backwashing and jetting and then a combination of high rate pumping, step drawdown and constant rate pumping tests for over 24 hours. At the beginning and end of the constant rate pumping, samples were taken for hydrochemical analysis (non-radiological). At the end of well development, each production well (with the exception of five low productivity wells) had a final sustainable production rate of >70 l/s. To date, production wells in the well field have typically been pumping at a rate of between 70 and 80 l/s. This yields a total potential well field production rate of approximately 4,000 l/s or 132 million m 3 /y.
Sampling
Sampling of the well field for the purposes of establishing levels of radioactive substances was initially undertaken between 2011 and 2013 during well field construction and Pb analysis were collected in virgin acid-washed polyethylene containers and acidified to a pH of <2 in the laboratory using 70% HNO 3 (Fluka >69% Grade). Samples for gross alpha and gross beta analysis were collected in virgin, acid-washed polyethylene or glass bottles and acidified to a pH of <2 in the laboratory using 37% HCl (Analar Normapur). Each sample was allowed to stand for at least 24 hours prior to chemical analysis to ensure that all acid-soluble substances entered solution.
After sampling of the well field had been completed, and water supply from the Ram aquifer system to Amman commenced, additional sampling started to allow the systematic determination of 226 Ra, 228 Ra and 210 Pb in the supply Table S1 ). These data and analytical performance data ( Supplementary Table S2) indicate that the methods used for the routine determination of the radioactive substances outlined in this report are fit for purpose and compliant with the most recent Jordanian drinking water standards ( JS ).
Determination of gross alpha and gross beta activity
Gross alpha and gross beta analysis were performed via evaporative enrichment and liquid scintillation counting (LSC) using a Canberra Packard 3100TR liquid scintillation analyser equipped with alpha discriminator (pulse decay analysis). This methodology was developed in house, and has been validated for the determination of gross alpha and beta radioactivity by laboratory quality control schemes and accredited to ISO 17025:2005 in the WAJ/MWI laboratories. The quoted detection limits (0.11 Bq/l and 0.28 Bq/l, respectively) and combined uncertainty for these methodologies (5.80% and 7.94%, respectively) are given in Supplementary Table S2 .
Whilst this method of analysis is gaining increasing recognition for the determination of gross alpha and beta activity in high total dissolved solids (TDS) waters
acknowledged that this methodology tends to overestimate reported levels in comparison to techniques based on the more traditional evaporation and gas proportional counting.
As a consequence, care must be used when comparing gross alpha and beta activities determined by different analytical methodologies ( Jobbagy et al. ) . In the Middle East, where the majority of waters are high TDS, and the radioactivity present predominantly due to natural series radionuclides, the method's overestimation of activity and high precision is considered to produce reproducible, conservative data on which to (a) trigger further assessments of radiological quality and (b) establish the success of water quality management.
Determination of 228 Ra
An 8-litre acidified sample was evaporated to a final volume of 1 litre. The residue was then placed in a high resolution gamma spectrometer (Canberra Low Level High Purity Germanium BE 5030 detector with 0.3 mm carbon window).
This spectrometer has an efficiency of 50% and high resol- 
Quantification of detection limits and methodological uncertainties
Performance criteria for the analytical methodologies employed in this work are given in the above paragraphs and summarized in Supplementary Table S2 . These data demonstrate that analytical methodologies employed by WAJ/MWI for individual radionuclides are fit for purpose (i.e. the analytical detection limit is more than a factor of ten below the guidance values).
The analytical detection limits for gross alpha and gross beta are less fit for purpose, being only a factor of 4-5 below the established reference levels for these measurements (JS , ; WHO , ). Whilst this is not ideal, the methodological difficulties in measuring low levels of gross alpha and gross beta in groundwater are internationally acknowledged.
Assessment of data in relation to drinking water standards
The guidelines for assessing hazards posed by the presence of radionuclides in drinking water adopted by most Ra accounts for the greatest proportion of total activity in the individual wells, and by inference the collective water from the Disi basin that is supplied, via the conveyance system, to Amman.
For the purposes of statistical calculations, activities corresponding to the isotopes' detection limit have been substituted where the result was below the analytical detection limit. The impact of this conservative assumption (Helsel ) on the data set as a whole is small, given that this rule had to be used only three times out of 324 individual analyses.
Since this initial assessment performed in early 2013, a further round of sampling and radiochemical analysis has been performed on samples from all operating wells within the well field, and a second additional round of analysis is almost complete. Results from these further analyses, summarized in Table 3 A discernible break into two identifiable distributions appears to occur when gross alpha activities lie below 1 Bq/ l (wells W32, W33, W35, W39, P1, P5 and P6). This break is not observed within the gross beta data set.
The downhole natural gamma ray logging of selected boreholes (Supplementary Figure S3) shows no direct correlation between observed activities and well depth ( Pb not determined in 6 and 12 monthly rounds. Data for initial round therefore supplemented in calculation of total dose for 6 and 12 month sampling rounds. 
Estimation of effective dose at the well head
Despite the fact that water from the Ram aquifer is typically being consumed >300 km from the well field (equating to a transit time of between 2 and 3 days) and subjected to mixing with other more local water sources during blending, it was considered prudent, based on previous studies (e.g. The results of these calculations are summarized in Table 3 and Supplementary Figure S8 with the total calculated total AED for all these radionuclides. The results shown re-emphasize the dominant contribution made by 228 Ra to the total AED of well waters from this aquifer.
On a sample-by-sample basis, the contribution of radioactivity from 228 Ra to the total AED exceeds 70% with the exception of two samples (W3 and W51) where the contributions from 228 Ra to the total estimated dose were significantly lower (28% and 50%, respectively).
Comparison of these calculated total AED values (Table 3) , derived from data in Table 2 , to an RRL of 0.5 mSv/y indicate on an individual basis that only 9 of the 55 sampled wells meet Jordanian water quality guidelines if they were to be consumed at source for a full year.
The highest 'at source' AED in the pre-commissioning data set was estimated to be 1.70 mSv/y on the basis of 228 Ra, (Table 4) . Whilst this average is slightly lower than the theoretical dose calculated from the contribution from individual wells (Table 3) , data from the individual wells and entry into the mixing reservoirs lie within the measured monthly range (±0.05 mSv/y (1 Sigma)).
When compared to the Jordanian standard, the calculated AEDs for individual wells, and the combined flow from the well field clearly demonstrate that such waters, if they were to be supplied directly without dilution (blending)
would result in consumers being exposed to AEDs exceeding the Jordanian RRL of 0.5 mSv/y. However, even at the full abstraction rate combined water from the well field • monitor any changes of radioactivity levels in the Disi and Mudawara well field (the preliminary results for this program to date have been discussed above);
• inform and test the effectiveness of intervention and treatment options.
The development of intervention options and associated activities are discussed in the following sections.
Intervention and treatment options
Initial intervention and treatment options began to be devel- After carefully considering a number of active treatment options for treating the 100 million m 3 /y abstraction from the well field, such as reverse osmosis, nano-filtration and lime softening, via environmental and cost-benefit analysis, it was decided that the most practicable and sustainable option for Jordan would be to blend waters from the Disi and Mudawara well field with other groundwater, and preferably surface water resources (when and where available).
This judgment was made on the basis of the following:
• The availability of a sufficient quantity of water, with a low radionuclide content, for blending.
• The need to improve the chemical and biological quality of water currently supplied to Amman.
• Benefits to the population where the Jordanian water quality standards (JS ) can be achieved with limited additional cost, thereby allowing resources to be better focused.
• Benefits to the environment, as there is no generated waste that requires national and local waste management strategies and guidelines.
• Cost effectiveness in terms of the cost of a treatment facility and the corresponding cost of waste handling, transport and disposal.
• Long-term flexibility, allowing for future treatment and water conveyance planning to further optimize the use of water from the Disi and Mudawara well field.
The case for using a blending approach was further Table S2 ) and indicate that both of these waters, which are principally derived from surface water bodies, have an AED of <0.02 mSv/y. On this basis, WAJ/MWI planned and commissioned a system for blending Disi and Mudawara well field water with water from the Zai and Zara Ma'en plants. The system put in place for undertaking this dilution process is shown schematically in Figure 3 , and a partial delivery arrangement with DWCP started supply to Amman in July 2013.
On the basis of available blending water and the concentration of radioactivity in water from the Disi and Mudawara well field, a blending ratio of 1 part Disi to 1 part Zara/Zai was theoretically possible, resulting in a 50% decrease in the concentration of radioactivity entering the water supply system.
However, as water demand and supply vary seasonally, it was accepted that this theoretical mixing ratio could not be absolutely guaranteed, especially given that both Zai and Zara Ma'en treatment plants are subject to disruption during periodic flooding and severe rain events. Table 4 show the actual mixing ratios obtained since the system was 
Emerging issues and investigations
Recent publications (Vengosh et al. ) and international guidance (ICRP ; WHO , ) highlight the need to consider lifetime exposure, and exposure to younger age groups, when evaluating impacts from radioactive substances in drinking water. However, whilst considering the feasibility of this approach, WHO () cautions that 'Insufficient evidence was found to introduce separate guidance levels for different age groups. Although infants and children consume a lower mean volume of drinking-water, the age-dependent dose coefficients for children are higher than those for adults, accounting for higher uptake or metabolic rates. In the case of prolonged contamination of the water source, an assessment of doses to infants and children may be considered.'
In order to test these assumptions WAJ/MWI used:
• ICRP and USEPA data to provide bio-kinetic and effective dose conversion data for newborn, 1yr, 5yr, 10yr, 15yr and adults (USEPA ; ICRP );
• data for water consumption within the same age groups from the USA (Ershow & Cantor );
• an assumed average lifetime of 70 years (i.e. duration of exposure). • levels of radioactivity leaving the well field by prioritizing abstraction from wells with the lowest levels of 228 Ra and the drilling of new wells in areas proven to be lower in radionuclide content; and
• the quantity of local water low in radioactivity made available for blending along the extent of the national carrier allowed greater dilution ratios to be utilized on a more frequent basis.
At The WAJ/MWI is considering lowering the predicted effective dose present at the consumers' point of supply even further by optimization of the well field pumping regime to achieve 0.64 mSv/y as raw Disi water, i.e. attaining a potential reduction of 28% from the initial dose during construction phase.
Furthermore, WAJ/MWI envisages putting in place measures to maximize the amounts of water blending after the construction of the national water conveyor and the reallocation of the water supply along the extension of the conveyor from south to north.
In conclusion, WAJ/MWI and others in Jordan are aware of radioactivity in water from Disi and indeed many other waters from the country and its neighbours. In developing the Disi resource, they have put in place mitigation measures that allow this valuable groundwater resource to be exploited and at the same time meet the sometimes competing needs for both water quality and water quantity in relation to human health and environmental quality.
As is the case for all nationally strategic water resources, WAJ/MWI will continue to monitor the radioactivity present in the raw water and blended water as per the requirements of the national standards and pertaining water sector strategy.
